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WASHINGTON INSIDER
Summer 2004
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The President's Council on Bioethics
New Appointees
In early March, before the first meeting of the council's second term, President
Bush appointed three new members to the council, Peter Augustine Lawler,
Diana Schaub, and Benjamin Carson. Lawler is a professor of government at Berry
College; Schaub is a professor of political science at Loyola College; Carson is a
neurosurgeon at Johns Hopkins University. At the same time, President Bush declined
to reappoint two members of the council, Elizabeth Blackburn and William F.
May.1 (Another member, Stephen Carter, had withdrawn from the council due to
other commitments.)
While May had written to the president that he did not wish to serve beyond
the initial two-year term, Blackburn protested her nonrenewal. Many advocates of
cloning and human embryonic stem cell research complained that the dismissal was
"political" and inappropriate.
However, these complaints are without merit. First, the president has authority
to appoint those whom he wishes; and every appointee serves at the pleasure of the
president. Second, several members who were originally appointed, including those
whose appointments were not renewed, have been unwilling to support any noticeable
limits on scientific research. For instance, both May and Blackburn declined, in
the council's report on human cloning, to support even a moratorium on cloning in
which embryonic human beings are destroyed.2 It is hard to see why a scientist who
would ignore the Nuremburg Code's fifth principle (prohibiting experimentation on a
human subject when it is known that death or disabling injury will result) should be
retained on the council. The plain fact is these were bad appointments in the first
place, and their nonrenewal is completely appropriate.3
Reports
The council's second report, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit
of Happiness, was issued in October 2003. The report, which was the result of
months of investigation by the council, including numerous public hearings, delves
into a subject that will become of increasing importance as new biotechnologies,
such as genetic modification, are developed. Commenting on the acceptability of
such modifications, sometimes characterized as the distinction, if any, between enhancement
(inappropriate) and therapy (appropriate), the council itself articulated
the matter as an inquiry into the ethical limits of worthy human aspirations.
The report considers the issue in four areas, including athletics.4 Of course,
any fan of major league baseball will be aware of the current controversy raging
over "enhancements" that certain athletes may have taken, enabling them to surpass
long-cherished records. In this area, as in the rest of the report, the council
treats this issue with the careful philosophical reflection it deserves. For instance,
the report makes the critical point that not only do we have bodies, but we are our
bodies. The report repays careful reading. Its aim is to spark an informed national
reflection on issues which go "beyond therapy." One can only hope it will receive
wide circulation, for the rapidity of advances in biotechnology means ethical issues
may not be noticed until too late.
One of the topics discussed in the report is sex selection. Many readers will be
familiar with the "one-child" policy in China, which has contributed to as many as
three hundred million abortions. Usually, in rural areas at least, these abortions are
of girls because families, if limited to one child, decide to have a boy whom they
expect to work the land and, unlike girls, not move away when they marry.
The report notes that in some countries the usual ratio of boy-births to girlbirths
of 105 to 100 is now 120 to 100. This is a recipe for social instability, as has
been observed in China. The report notes that assisted reproductive technologies
(ART) are often used for sex selection of offspring. In the U.S., while ART is used
in only about 1 percent of the cases, the numbers are growing. It is chilling to
consider the increasing use of ART as a sex-selection tool.
The council issued a report on reproductive technologies, Reproduction and
Responsibility: The Regulation of New Biotechnologies, on April 1. The report
and the reaction it elicited will be discussed in the next edition of this column.
Effort to Undermine the President's Stem-Cell Research Policy
The controversy, noted above, over the nonrenewal of Elizabeth Blackburn's
appointment to the President's Council has formed one part of an emerging strategy
by advocates of embryonic stem-cell research to roll back the president's policy on
the issue.5 It will be recalled that President Bush prohibited the use of federal funds
for research involving the destruction of human embryos if that destruction took
place after the date of his order (i.e., after August 9, 2001).6
In early March, reports appeared in the press that the National Institutes of
Health had concluded that the embryonic stem-cell lines which could be funded
under the president's policy were inadequate for research purposes.7 "The unpublished
report" that was "circulating ... on Capitol Hill" reportedly concluded that
there were no more than fifteen embryonic stem cell lines that met the requirements
of both the president's policy and science. Other existing lines were inadequate for
one reason or another. Though this is basically a rehash of familiar arguments against
the president's policy, it formed the "justification" of other steps in the attack. Basing
his argument on such scientific misgivings, Republican Congressman Mike Castle
from Delaware prepared a letter to President Bush, endorsed by many fellow House
members, opposing the President's policy.8 Pro-embryonic stem-cell research advocacy
groups, such as the Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research,
then followed suit with a strong lobbying campaign relying heavily on Castle's letter.9
Editorials similar to that in the Post appeared in influential journals in the states.
Ironically, one of the fears expressed by these embryonic stem-cell research
proponents—that the president's policy would drive the biotech industry overseas—
was undercut by an announcement by Harvard University that it had established a
stem-cell research center on campus focusing primarily on embryonic stem cells.10
However, Harvard's announcement underscored the real problem with the president's
policy—it does not prohibit the destruction of embryonic human beings. It simply
precludes federal funding of such "research" in most cases; such research (and
embryonic destruction) may continue with private funds (depending on what an
individual state's law allows11). Thus, if there is a reconsideration of the president's
policy, it should be not to weaken but to strengthen it—it should be extended to a
total ban (federal and state) on destructive human embryonic stem-cell research
(regardless of the date or purpose).
International Developments in Cloning
In a surprising development, the Canadian Parliament, on March 12, passed a
law that bans human cloning, whether for live birth or for destructive research. Bill
C-6, An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research,
still requires "royal assent," but that is expected soon.12 (Stem-cell research continues
to be under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. While
embryos cannot be created for research purposes, it appears "spare" IVF embryos
may be used for research.)
South Korea dropped a bombshell in early March when scientists there claimed
to be the first to have successfully cloned a human embryo, from which they extracted
stem cells.13 The announcement produced a furor, prompting the scientists
to promise to cease cloning until ethical issues are resolved.14 Upon close examination,
however, it is clear that the scientists are responding to concerns about a) the
birth of a cloned human being, and b) the commodification of human eggs. The latter
concern, while important, has somewhat been overtaken by other events, since eggs
are now available for sale over the internet.15 The former concern has already been
addressed by Korean laws which forbid the practice. Since all human cloning produces
a human being, whether it is ultimately born alive or not, what was striking
about the scientists' "ethical" concerns was the absence of any attention to the
question of ethical limits on destroying embryonic human beings during research.
Meanwhile the United States announced that it will continue to work through
the United Nations to secure support for a treaty to ban all forms of human cloning.
In doing so, the United States will join with Costa Rica, which has been leading the
anticloning effort. Last year, a procedural vote at the UN prevented the issue from
being addressed by the General Assembly. Several nations had supported a ban of
live-birth cloning only. However, last year, there appeared to be sufficient votes to
pass a resolution to develop a treaty for a total ban. Nonetheless, opponents of a
total ban (and nations angry with the United States for other reasons) succeeded in
passing a procedural motion that would have delayed a vote for two years.16 Costa
Rica and other anticloning nations were, in turn, successful in reducing the delay to
a single year. This means the matter will be on the agenda for the fall of 2004.
Conscience Protection
In March, the California Supreme Court decided Catholic Charities of Sacramento
v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (no. S099822). The Court held
that Catholic Charities must include prescription contraceptives within its insurance
plans. The case turned on whether Catholic Charities qualified as a "religious employer"
under California law. California's Women's Contraceptive Equity Act requires
that prescription contraceptives be provided. However the law has an exception
for religious employers. A religious employer is, in turn, defined in the California
statute as an entity
- whose purpose is the inculcation of religious values,
- that primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets,
- that primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets, and
- that qualifies as a "church" under federal tax law.17
Catholic Charities met none of these elements of the definition. It was a nonprofit
organization, employing individuals with diverse religious beliefs, and was engaged
in offering social services to the general public. Of course, the reason Catholic
Charities exists is to respond to the social teaching of the Church by meeting the just
requirements of members of society. It is surely a "religious" purpose in any fair
understanding of the term. But that purpose does not satisfy the statutory requirements
of California law. Thus, Catholic Charities must either deny all prescription
drug coverage to its employees or provide coverage for contraceptives.
This case points to a growing trend across the country to limit or deny conscience
protection. Individuals and organizations favoring embryonic stem-cell research,
abortion, contraceptive (including abortifacient) coverage, and other unethical
"medical" practices are pursuing a two-track strategy. First, they seek legislation
legalizing the procedure. Then they move to limit, if not eliminate, the conscience
rights of workers and/or organizations to refuse to participate. Consequently,
expanded conscience protection is needed at both the federal and state levels.18 The
Abortion Non-Discrimination Act (ANDA), S. 1397/H.R. 3664, pending in Congress,
extends conscience protection regarding abortion.19
As the Catholic Charities case illustrates, it is important that conscience protection
not be narrowly drawn. The law should ensure the right of conscience for all
individuals and organizations, not just those that are indisputably part of a church.
Partial-Birth Abortion Litigation
In October, the ban on partial-birth abortion (PBA) passed the Senate by a
vote of 64 to 34. However, even before the ban was signed into law by President
Bush in early November, pro-abortion groups and individuals filed suits in three
separate federal district courts (Nebraska, New York, San Francisco) asserting that
the ban was unconstitutional. The Department of Justice is litigating the cases on
behalf of the government.
Readers may recall that in Stenberg v. Carhart (530 US 914 [2000]), the U.
S. Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska statute banning PBA. The current version
of the ban was enacted to respond to the Court's decision in Stenberg as well
as to respond to problems in the original Nebraska law. The bill has extensive congressional
findings of fact. These are traditionally accorded great deference by the
courts.
In all three cases, temporary restraining orders against the ban were issued. In
all three cases, the trial on a preliminary injunction as well as the trial on the merits
of the underlying case was consolidated (meaning one trial rather than two). This
should result in the creation of a solid evidentiary record when some or all of the
judgments are appealed by the Department of Justice.
Since plaintiffs in these cases asserted that PBA was a necessary medical
procedure in certain cases, the Department of Justice sought medical records to
ascertain the validity of those claims. The result has been a good deal of preliminary
litigation about whether and in what manner such records should be produced. Nevertheless,
all three cases went to trial on March 29 of this year. Appeals will then
proceed through the appellate courts, and, eventually, to the Supreme Court. It is
impossible to predict when the issue will reach the Supreme Court (or whether the
Court will take the case[s] or decline to hear it).
Unborn Victims of Violence Act
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act was voted upon by the US Senate on
March 25. It passed the Senate by a vote of 61 to 38. Since the Act had passed the
U.S. House of Representatives on February 26 by a vote of 254 to 163, it was sent
to the President to sign into law. He did so on April 1.
The act, which received public momentum due to publicity surrounding the
alleged murder of a mother by her husband due to her pregnancy, would make it a
federal offense to kill or injure an unborn child during the commission of a federal
crime.20 The act, however, faced two "killer" amendments, one that will be introduced
by Senator Diane Feinstein and the other by Senator Patty Murray.
The first amendment would not recognize the humanity of the unborn child but
would instead create, and punish, a second crime by the criminal against the mother,
rather than the child. The second amendment, constituting 156 pages, would rewrite
employment law to mandate that employers allow up to one month of unpaid
leave if employees suffer domestic violence. Each amendment was a "killer" since,
if adopted by the Senate, the Senate version would require a conference with the
House because the House and Senate versions of the act would differ. In that case,
it was expected that anti-life members of the Congress would delay the appointment
of "conferees" for the conference through this fall's federal elections. That would
have effectively ended any chance for passage of the act in this Congress. However,
the Feinstein amendment was defeated by a vote of 50 to 49, and the Murray
amendment was defeated, 53 to 46.
The Federal Marriage Amendment
As readers may be aware, last June, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision
in Lawrence v. Texas (539 U.S. 558 [2003]). In that case, a Texas law penalizing
sodomy between homosexuals was struck down as a violation of the substantive
due-process rights of the plaintiffs. While the Texas law might have been struck
down on a narrower "equal protection" ground (for penalizing homosexual, but not
heterosexual, sodomy), the Court's opinion was broad, striking down all antisodomy
laws and directly reversing earlier Supreme Court precedent.
This is significant in two respects. First, the Texas law against sodomy was
evidence of a public policy against such acts. That is important if a "full faith and
credit" claim is made under the U.S. Constitution.21 The full faith and credit clause
ensures that public acts and records of one state must be given "full faith and credit"
in another. One defense to doing so, however, is where the public acts from the first
state violate the public policy of the second state. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence, it might well have been argued that, say, Texas's law against
sodomy was evidence of such a public policy and would necessarily have been
violated if homosexual marriages were recognized in Texas (since such acts are
part and parcel of a homosexual relationship). But Lawrence has eliminated that
argument. Additionally, in November, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (440 MA 309 [2003]) that
there was no rational basis to preclude homosexuals from marrying. Thus, once
marriage licenses are issued to homosexual couples in Massachusetts, those couples
may move to other states and argue that the full faith and credit clause requires that
states recognize their homosexual marriage.22
Second, the Court in Lawrence articulated its decision in language that tracks
language the Court used in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (505 US 833 [1992]). In
that case, the Court spoke of an individual's right to define the meaning of life and of
the universe as he saw fit, thereby putting decisions such as abortion into the realm
of "personal" rights entitled to constitutional protection. Therefore, if the question
whether homosexuals have a right to marry under the substantive due-process provisions
of the U.S. Constitution comes before the Supreme Court, it seems likely the
Court (which spoke, in Lawrence, of the right of homosexuals to contend in the
public square for the right to marry) will find such a right exists.
Thus, under either of two constitutional approaches—a full faith and credit
claim, or a substantive due-process claim—it appears likely the U.S. Supreme Court
will uphold a right for homosexuals to marry. Hence, there is pressing need for an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution to preclude either course. Versions of such an
amendment have been introduced in the House (H.J. Res. 56) and the Senate (S.J.
Res. 26). In the past week the Senate version has been revised and renumbered as
S.J. Res. 30. It reads—"Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union
of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the Constitution of any State,
shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred
upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman."
The exact meaning of the first sentence is disputed. Does it preclude recognition
of any sexual relationship other than heterosexual marriage? It may, in which
case no state would be permitted to recognize "domestic partnerships" that were
limited to persons engaged in homosexual conduct.
The second sentence is intended to remove the primary engine behind the
movement to recognize "homosexual marriage," that is, the courts (as can be seen
from the discussion of the Goodridge and Lawrence cases above). The second
sentence ensures that if changes are to be made in the institution of marriage, it will
be the people acting through their elected representatives who do so.
The debate over this matter is far from over. Alternative versions of a constitutional
amendment will certainly be introduced in the Congress. With national elections
coming in the fall, and with the increasing issuance of marriage licenses to
homosexuals by various municipal authorities across the country, the effort to defend
traditional, natural marriage by amending the federal constitution will only intensify.
President Bush has endorsed such an amendment.23 Congress will continue
to devote extended attention to the matter (congressional hearings were held on the
matter during the week of March 22). Of course, under Article V of the Constitution,
an amendment must receive a two-thirds positive vote in both the House and
the Senate, before being sent to the states, where it must be ratified by threequarters
of the states. At present, it is unlikely that the two-thirds majorities can be
mustered in the House and the Senate. Consequently, it will be important for this
issue to be central to this fall's elections. As noted, unless the people act through
their elected representatives to preserve marriage, it seems the courts will inevitably
recognize "homosexual marriage." In a society such as ours where many factors,
including excessively liberal divorce laws, have severely weakened the institution of
marriage, a strong public commitment to the institution is needed.
William L. Saunders
Director and Senior Fellow
Center for Human Life and Bioethics
Family Research Council
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1
Additional members of the council are Robert P. George, Gilbert Meilaender, Rebecca
S. Dresser, Francis Fukuyama, Michael J. Sandel, James Q. Wilson, Janet D. Rowley, Charles
Krauthammer, William B. Hurlbut, Paul McHugh, Michael S. Gazzaniga, Mary Ann Glendon,
Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, Daniel W. Foster, and Leon R. Kass.
2
See President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical
Inquiry (Washington, D.C.: President's Council on Bioethics, 2002), 131, 145.
3
It is troubling that other members of the council who appear to support scientific research
without significant ethical limits were retained on the council.
4
The section titles are "Better Children," "Superior Performance," "Ageless Bodies,"
and "Happy Souls."
5
For instance, see, "The Ethics of Science," Washington Post, March 8, 2004, A18, where
the nonrenewal of Blackburn is linked to arguments against the president's stem-cell research
policy.
6
In January 2004, the President's Council on Bioethics presented its report on the
president's policy, current scientific developments, and ethical issues in Monitoring Stem
Cell Research (Washington, D.C.: President's Council on Bioethics, 2004).
7
E.g., Justin Gillis and Rick Weiss, "NIH: Few Stem Cell Colonies Likely Available for
Research: Of Approved Lines, Many are Failing," Washington Post, March 3, 2004, A3.
8
A copy of the letter can be found at http://www.rarediseases.org/nord/washington/
pdf/houseletter_topresbush_3504.pdf.
9
See http://www.camradvocacy.org/fastaction/takeaction.asp.
10
Theo Emery, "Harvard University Planning Stem Cell Research Center," Associated
Press, February 29, 2004.
11
There is a strong push in many states, such as Illinois, to follow the lead of New
Jersey, which, as reported in the previous edition of this column (Spring 2004), passed the
strongest law in favor of destruction embryo research. The motive behind, and sometimes
the argument for, these bills is often nakedly financial, as the states stumble over themselves
to become the "silicon valley" of human embryonic stem-cell research.
12
See Doug Payne, "Canada Passes Cloning Law," Scientist, March 16, 2004.
13
See Woo Suk Hwang et al, "Evidence of a Pluripotent Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Line Derived from a Cloned Blastocyst," Science 303.5664 (March 12, 2004): 1669–1674.
14
Kim Tae-gyu, "Commercial Application of Embryo Cloning Due within 10 Years,"
Korea Times, February 19, 2004.
15
See Isabel Oakeshott, "Human Eggs for Sale on the Net," Evening Standard (London),
February 23, 2004. The Canadian bill noted above, however, bans such sale.
16
See, e.g., Colum Lynch, "Effort to Ban Human Cloning Will Resume: Bush Administration,
Allies Will Pursue U.N. Vote Despite Diplomatic Setback," Washington Post, December
6, 2003, A4.
17
See http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_39_bill_19990928_chaptered.html.
18
There is a vigorous battle on this issue in many states. For instance, Wisconsin recently
expanded conscience protection (2003 SB 21), but the governor was expected to veto
the bill. The debate there, as elsewhere, is whether it somehow deprives women of "health
services" such as abortion if a health-care provider declines to perform, provide, or cover
such a "service," even if there are other health-care providers who do provide it.
19
ANDA, in essence, protects health-care entities which decline to perform, refer
for, train in, or provide coverage for or payment for abortions. It has a broad definition of
health-care entities—all hospitals, health professionals, provider sponsored organizations,
health-maintenance organizations, health insurance plans, and all other kinds of health-care
facilities, organizations, or plans.
20
Twenty-nine states currently provide that when a criminal commits a crime against
the mother and kills or injures her unborn child, the action against the child constitutes an
additional offense. The murder of mother and unborn child which generated renewed interest
in the act matter, would not itself, ironically, be prohibited under the act since the underlying
crime (murder) is not a federal crime and the act only applies if there is an underlying
"federal crime of violence." Federal crimes of violence include drug-related shootings, violence
in an airport, assaulting a federal officer, and killing or assaulting federal witnesses.
21
U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings
shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
22
There is a federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that rests upon the language
in the full faith and credit clause which gives Congress the power to "prescribe ... the effect"
of "acts, records, and proceedings." However, given the Supreme Court's view of
sexual acts as fundamental, constitutionally protected rights, it seems at least highly questionable
whether the federal DOMA will survive a court challenge.
23
In a statement at the White House on February 24, 2004, the president said, "I call
upon the Congress to promptly pass, and to send to the states for ratification, an amendment
to our Constitution defining and protecting marriage as a union of a man and woman as husband
and wife. The amendment should fully protect marriage, while leaving the state legislatures
free to make their own choices in defining legal arrangements other than marriage" A
copy of the statement can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html.
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